The eurozone's architects have created a doomsday machine and a gift

"The lack of a constitutional (or Treaty-enabled) process for exiting the Eurozone has a solid logic behind it. The whole point of creating the common currency was to impress the markets that it is a permanent union that will guarantee huge losses to anyone bold enough to bet against its solidity. A single exit suffices to punch a hole through this perceived solidity. Like a tiny fault line on a mighty dam, a Greek exit will inevitably lead to the edifice's collapse under the unstoppable forces of disintegration that will gain a toehold within that fault line. The moment Greece is pushed out two things will happen: a massive capital flight from Dublin, Lisbon, Madrid etc., followed by a reluctance of the ECB and Berlin to authorise unlimited liquidity to banks and states. This will mean the immediate bankruptcy of whole banking systems plus Italy and Spain. At that point, Germany will face a hideous dilemma: jeopardise the solvency of the German state (by committing a few trillions to the task of saving what is left of the Eurozone) or bailing itself out (i.e. Germany leaving the Eurozone). I have no doubt that it will choose the latter. And since this will mean tearing up a number of EU Treaties and Charters (including the ECB's) the EU will, in essence, cease to exist."
But the eurozone's architects failed to follow through with the logic of a political union.  Nobody cares about "trade imbalances" in the Canadian confederation.  And nobody would care if Alberta, for example, were to run perpetual trade surpluses with the other 9 provinces.  Fiscal transfers from the strong to the weak are part of the Canadian bargain in a full national union.  Had Europe adopted a similar federal structure, the Greek and Spanish issues would be moot.
As it stands, however, the architects of the euro have created a doomsday machine and a gift for speculative capital.  Which brings me to our second view:  in a scholarly paper "Sudden Stops In The Euro Area", Silvia Merler and Jean Pisani-Ferry, (Bruegel Policy Contribution, March 2012), the authors tell us that throughout the evolution of the architecture of the European monetary union, it was assumed that deposit movements from one country to another would all be smoothly handled by the market mechanism.Apparently this remarkable denial behavior persisted even after the current euro crisis broke out with the revelation of grave fiscal problems facing Greece in late 2009. It seems that it persisted even when the euro crisis engulfed all of Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain in 2010 and early 2011.